Who said that deterministic social realism is unattainable?

Aristotle’s mutually presupposing preconditions (hexeis tou alhtheuein) as laid out in his Metaphysics are still operative, albeit, thanks to successive paradigmatic shifts, in a culturally pragmatic form. In its application, problems do not arise (at most) with the diagnosis of the properties that thanks to any inherentist paradigm are ascribed to a phenomenon (well, facilitated a bit by arguing from “in virtue of”), but with  the prescriptive validity of the hermeneutical (not explanatory, don’t be a hardcore positivist) conditions. Thanks to social cybernetics the latter is no longer a problem, as the repetitive manufacturing of observations attains to confer axiomatic status on working hypotheses (and methodological conditions and methods of “doing business” in between). All it takes is agreement on two levels, among the producers of the conditionals and among the observers (in fact, Feyerabend’s testimonials on the decision making process that is taking place during “symposia” could not be further from accuracy- that is metasocially realistic) . Who said that deterministic social realism in unattainable?  It is attainable in so far as there is agreement on particulars (as instantiations or correlates- hexeis- of universals and not as deterministically or probabilistically, if one wished to ramify determinism- explained by them; for once more equilibrium must be maintained at all costs), even though when agreement is not the outcome of a conscious process, but the result of group dynamics with participants in various levels of ex positio decision making, all bound up by the Abilene paradox and silence.  Concordially yours

[reproducing a postcard from the AI Modelling agency, a subsidiary of the Intergalactic probability agency].